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TORT LIABILITY OF THE MEDIA
INTRODUCTION
The parents of a teenage boy sue three major broadcast
networks, after their son shoots and kills their 83 year old
neighbor1 ... A widow sues "TuPac" and his record label after
her husband, a state trooper was shot by an individual who
claimed that TuPac's album caused him to shoot the
officer 2... A mother sues Hustler magazine after her son hangs
himself to his death while attempting auto-erotic asphyxiation
as depicted in the magazine.3
The above is a sampling of cases that have been brought against
movie producers, magazine and book publishers, newspapers,
radio, and television broadcasters for physical harm allegedly
resulting from the speech they disseminate. These causes of action
are grounded in various theories of tort, including negligence,
negligent misrepresentation, strict products liability and attractive
nuisance.4 Most of these claims have been unsuccessful due to the
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.5
1 See Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fl. 1979).
2 See Davidson v. Time Warner, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
3 See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987).
4 See Johnathan B. Becker, The First Amendment Goes Tactical: New Media Negligence and
Ongoing Criminal Incidents, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 626, 627 (1995) (discussing causes of action
available against media); Laura W. Brill, The First Amendment and the Power of Suggestion:
Protecting "Negligent" Speakers in Cases of Imitative Hann, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 986 (1994)
(stating victims of media related harms have increasingly relied on tort of negligence in
seeking judicial remedy); Sandra Davidson, Blood Money: When Media Exposes Others to Risk of
Bodily Harm, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 225, 229 (1997) (reviewing doctrines of
negligence, strict liability and incitement); see also Jeffrey Haag, If Words Could Kill: Rethinking
Tort Liability in Texas for Media Speech that Incites Dangerous or Illegal Activity, 30 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1421, 1424-1435 (1999) (discussing various theories of liability that have been employed
in such cases).
5 See Brill, supra note 4, at 987 (noting that such claims have almost always failed); see also
E. Barrett Prettyman & Lisa A. Hook, The Control of Media Related Imitative Violence, 38 FED.
COMM. L.J. 317, 380 (1987) (noting that courts are reluctant to impose liability); Andrew B.
Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting From Media Speech: A Comprehensive
First Amendment Approach, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 231, 233 (1992) (stating many courts have accepted
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The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 6 It affords
protection for speech which offends, impassions, and angers.7 This
right, however, is not absolute.8 The United States Supreme Court
has carved out four categories of speech which are exempted from
protection under the First Amendment: fighting words, 9 obscenity,lO
defamation,11 and speech which is likely to incite imminent lawless
action.12
argument that media defendants deserve First Amendment protection beyond common law
and statutory defenses normally afforded negligence or tort defendants under state law); Alan
Stephens, First Amendment Guaranty of Freedom of Speech of Press as Defense to Liability Stemming
From Speech Allegedly Causing Bodily Injun, 94 A.L.R. FED. 26, 2 (1999) (noting that liability, in
cases of television broadcasts and movies, has generally been barred on First Amendment
grounds).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7 See Collins v. Jordan, 102 F.3d 406, 414 (9th Cir. 1996); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 (1995) (discussing free speech); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,
196 (1992) (discussing right of free speech.); see also Gerald S. Smith, Media Liability for Physical
Injiry Resulting from the Negligent Use of Words, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1193, 1200 (1988) (addressing
underlying interests that are promoted by Freedom of Speech); Lise Vansen, Incitement by Any
Other Name: Dodging a First Amendment Misfire in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 25 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 605, 605 (1998) (discussing scope of fundamental right to free speech).
8 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) (stating right of free speech is not absolute);
Terri R. Day, Publications That Incite, Solicit, or Instnct: Publisher Responsibility or Caveat
Emnptor?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 73 (1995) (noting certain categories of speech fall outside
of protection of First Amendment); see also Mike Quinlan and Jim Persels, It's Not My Fault,
The Devil Made Me Do It: Attempting to Inpose Tort Liability on Publishers, Producers, and Artists
for Injuries Allegedly "Inspired" By Media Speech, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 435 (1994) (recognizing
categories of traditionally unprotected speech); Smith, supra note 7, at 1200 (noting that right
of free speech is not absolute).
9 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (discussing statutes prohibiting
fighting words); see also Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 130-34 (1973) (stating
fighting words are not protected); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942)
(holding that words, spoken directly to addressee and likely to provoke average person,
causing breach of peace, are not protected). See generally Phyllis A. Flora, Constitutional Law -
Neutral Requirements Established for Expression Otherwise Unprotected Under the First Amendment,
27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 175, 175 (1993) (discussing argument that fighting words are not
protected speech).
10 See Miller v. California, 43 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (stating First Amendment allows
carefully limited regulation of obscenity); see also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474
(1966) (asserting that publications that appeal solely to prurient interests may be regulated);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not constitutionally
protected speech). See generally Donovan W. Gaede, Constitutional Law - Policing the Obscene:
Modern Obscenity Doctrine Re-Evaluated, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 439, 439 (1995) (discussing obscenity).
11 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985) (stating
First Amendment protections regarding public issues not relevant to defamatory speech);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (holding defamatory statements are not
immune from constitutional standards); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334
(1974) (finding defamation laws limited in matters of legitimate public concerns). See generally
Rodric B. Schoen, Defamation and Privacy in the Texas Supreme Court Since New York Times, 37 S.
TEX. L. REV. 81, 81 (1996) (discussing constitutional balancing in defamation decisions in Texas
Supreme Court).
12 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (articulating Brandenburg test to
determine whether speech is likely to incite lawless action); see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne
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Most courts confronted with First Amendment issues involving
media defendants have barred recovery13 based upon the incitement
standard established in Brandenburg v. Ohio.14 If the speech in
question does not fall into one of the unprotected categories of
speech, courts are reluctant to impose liability.15 Some
commentators have argued that the Brandenburg standard presents
an almost impenetrable barrier for plaintiffs seeking redress for
injuries allegedly caused by media defendants.1 6
Despite the long line of cases that have employed a Brandenburg
analysis,17 the court in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises18 departed from this
theory in a groundbreaking decision. In Rice, the United States
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982) (asserting mere advocacy of violence does not
remove constitutional protections); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that
words directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and likely to incite or
produce such action are not protected under First Amendment). See generally Leigh
Noffsinger, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First Amendment Distinguishing True
Threats Fromo Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1209, 1215 (1999) (noting that
Brandenburg expanded First Amendment protections).
13 See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying
recovery under Brandenburg to survivors of teenager due to absence of incitement in magazine
article describing autoerotic asphyxiation); Zamora v. CBS, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199,206 (S.D. Fla.
1979) (finding no incitement under Brandenburg, and therefore no liability); McCollum v. CBS,
Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (1988) (denying liability to record producer for suicide as no
showing of intent to produce imminent lawless action in song lyrics); Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad.
Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (1981) (holding no liability for television network for portrayal of
rape imitated by group of teenagers); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d
1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (holding no liability for "unprotected incitement" under Brandenburg
where gang imitated violent scene portrayed in film); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa.
Super. 1989) (holding theory of incitement insufficient to limit diet book publisher's First
Amendment protections).
14 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
15 See Day, supra note 8, at 73 (1995) (noting that if speech does not fall into one of
unprotected categories, liability is barred); see also Prettyman and Hook, supra note 5, at 372
(stating if programming does not rise to level of incitement, speech is fully protected and may
be unreachable by tort liability); Quinlan and Persels, supra note 8, at 435 (1994) (advocating
that speech not satisfying Brandenburg requirements should be accorded First Amendment
protection).
16 See Vansen, supra note 7, at 610 (proposing reworking of Brandenburg standard); see also
David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the
Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 54 (1994) (suggesting contextual case-by-
case analysis); Sims, supra note 5, at 282 (proposing balancing test); Smith, supra note 7, at 1195
(arguing for application of traditional negligence theory); Diane Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight and a Farewell to Warren and Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 318
(1983) (discussing difficulty of satisfying Brandenburg).
17 See, e.g., Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023 (denying recovery under Brandenburg for magazine
article); Zamnora, 480 F. Supp. at 206 (finding no incitement under Brandenburg); McCollum, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 193 (holding that no intent by record company to produce imminent lawless
action); Olivia N., 178 Cal. Rptr. at 888 (holding no liability for television network portrayal of
rape); Yakubowicz, 536 N.E.2d at 1071 (finding no liability for violent film scene due to absence
of incitement under Brandenburg); Smith, 563 A.2d at 123 (holding that incitement was
insufficient under Brandenburg).
18 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, reversed the District
Court's decision, and held a defendant publisher may be liable
under a theory of civil aiding and abetting.19 This decision may have
a profound impact on the First Amendment interests of the media.20
Rice has provided plaintiffs with a novel cause of action in cases
against media defendants, and most importantly, it has seemingly
removed this class of cases from the purview of the First
Amendment.21
This Note will consider the potential impact of the decision in
Rice. Part I will discuss the evolution of incitement as
constitutionally unprotected speech, and the development of the
Brandenburg analysis. Part II of this Note will examine leading cases
in the context of media liability for words that allegedly cause
physical harm or injury. Part III will discuss the decision in Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, as well as the decision's impact on future cases.
Part IV will explore the feasibility of the theory developed in this
case, concluding that future courts should not follow the rationale
evoked by the Circuit court in Rice. In conclusion, this Note
proposes that courts should adhere to a bright line Brandenburg
analysis when assessing cases involving media defendants.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRANDENBURG "INCITEMENT"
ANALYSIS
A. Hand's Masses Approach
In Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,22 Judge Hand created a First
19 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 267 (holding that First Amendment poses no bar to civil aiding and
abetting, and that this claim is sufficient to withstand summary judgment).
20 See Isaac Molnar, Resurrecting the Bad Tendency Test to Combat Instructional Speech;
Militias Beware: Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 59 Ot-o ST. L.J. 1333, 1333 (1998) (discussing impact
of decision in Rice); see also Robert J. Coursey III, Another Case of Freedom vs. Safety: Stretching
the First Amnendmnent to Protect the Publication of Murder Manuals - Brandenburg Need Not Apply?,
14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 897 (1998) (analyzing decision in Rice as oversimplification); Haag,
supra note 4, at 1449 (addressing implications of Rice as alternative theory of liability). See
generally Amy K. Dilworth, Murder in the Abstract: The First Amendment and the Misappropriation
o/Brandenburg, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 565 (1998) (discussing decision in Rice).
21 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 242 (stating First Amendment poses no bar to civil aiding and
abetting); see also Coursey III, supra note 20, at 897 (discussing implications of Rice); Haag,
supra note 4, at 1449 (arguing Rice decision has provided additional cause of action); Molnar,
supra note 20, at 1333 (discussing consequences of Rice).
22 See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (granting injunction
preventing postmaster from excluding from mail monthly periodical that was highly critical
of United States' war efforts during World War I), rev'd, 246 F. 24, 38-39 (2d. Cir. 1917)
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Amendment analysis allowing suppression of speech when a
speaker's words were a direct incitement to illegal activity.23 This
approach focused less upon the likelihood that the speech would
produce danger, and focused more on the nature of the words
themselves. 24 Although Judge Hand's decision was reversed on
appeal, his ideas would later be adopted.25
B. Clear and Present Danger
In Schenck v. United States,26 Justice Holmes developed the 'clear
and present danger' test.27 Under this test, the question in every case
becomes whether the words are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.28 Subsequently, Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United
States29 modified the clear and present danger standard to
incorporate an immediacy element, which would signify a more
speech protective standard.30
(reversing injunction granted by district court holding that since words were used in effort to
persuade, it was irrelevant that they did not directly incite).
23 See Masses, 244 F. at 536 (stating objective scrutiny of speaker's words must be applied
before denouncing speech in question).
24 See id. at 536 (noting only words whose objective meaning causes direct incitement may
be prohibited); Cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (noting that circumstances
determine whether speech is protected).
25 See Michael P. Kopech, Shouting 'Incitement!' In the Courtroom: An Evolving Theonj of
Civil Liability?, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 173, 177 (1987) (noting that although case was reversed on
appeal, Judge Hand proved to be far ahead of his contemporaries with regard to protection of
free speech); see also Frederick M. Lawrence, The Day the Presses Stopped, A History of the
Pentagon Papers Case: The Collission of Rights in Violence Conducive Speech, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
1333, 1344 (1998) (discussing Hand's analysis).
26 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47-49 (1919) (affirming convictions for obstructing recruitment
and enlistment activities of military by distributing pamphlets).
27 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (discussing clear and present danger test); see also Lawrence.
supra note 25, at 1338 (discussing Holmes analysis in Schenck). See generally Edward J.
Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the Clear and Present Danger Theory of the First Amendment, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1118 (1989) (discussing Schenck decision); Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of
Unlawful Conduct and The First Amendment, In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 1159, 1166-67 (discussing development of clear and present danger test).
28 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (reasoning that Schenck's distribution of leaflets during
wartime created danger that young men would dodge draft, creating evil Congress had both
right and obligation to prevent); Tom Hentoff, Speech Hann and Self Governiment, Understanding
the Ainbit of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1991) (discussing
Schenck decision); see also Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, How iminent is Imminent?: The Imminent
Danger Test Applied to Murder Mannals, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 53-54 (1997) (discussing
courts analysis in Schenck).
29 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (upholding defendant's
conviction under Espionage Act for protesting American intervention in Russian
revolutionary battle).
30 See Abramns, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating only present danger of
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The clear and present danger doctrine was further developed in
Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California.31 Justice
Brandeis stated that the clarity of the danger lies in the distinction
between advocacy and incitement.32 He furthered argued that
advocacy, even of a morally reprehensible violation of law, is
insufficient to comprise incitement.33 Justice Brandeis recognized
the flaw in the clear and present danger test was that fear of serious
injury alone cannot justify suppression of free speech. 34 In Dennis v.
United States,35 the clear and present danger test evolved into a
balancing test, which weighed the gravity of the danger against the
likelihood that if the speech was permitted, the feared danger would
occur.36 The essence of a balancing test is that if one factor increases,
the other factor may decrease without affecting the result.37
immediate evil is sufficient to suppress speech); see also Bloustein, supra note 27, at 1141-42
(noting that modifications made in Abrams gave more protection); Lawrence, supra note 25, at
1338 n.16 (discussing Holmes dissent in Abrams). See generally G. Edward White, Justice Holmes
and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REv. 391,
392 (1992) (discussing Holmes opinions from Schenck to Abrams).
31 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (outlining elements necessary to satisfy clear and present
danger doctrine); see also Redish, supra note 27, at 1171 (discussing Court's decision in
Wiitney).
32 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (noting wide difference between advocacy and incitement,
preparation and attempt, and assembling and conspiracy); see also Bloustein, supra note 27, at
1144 n.152 (citing Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney).
33 See Vhitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (stating incitement occurs when immediate evil, advocated
by utterance, will occur before remedy can be effected); see also Hentoff, supra note 28, at 1459
n.30 (discussing distinction between advocacy and incitement); Redish, supra note 27, at 1179
(discussing incitement standard); Christina E. Wells, Of Communists and Anti-Abortion
Protestors: The Consequences of Falling Into the Theoretical Abyss, 33 GA. L. REv. 1, 3 n.10 (1998)
(noting Supreme Court in recent decades has adopted more explicit rules prohibiting, both
directly and indirectly, government suppression of particular viewpoints).
34 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (stating speech should be protected unless immediate
serious violence was advocated or to be expected); see also Coursey, supra note 20, at 883
(discussing Whitney decision); Hentoff, supra note 28, at 1459 n.31 (discussing requirement of
serious and immediate violence).
35 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951) (upholding convictions of communist party members who
organized group advocating violent overthrow of government in violation of Smith Act).
36 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (discussing balancing test); see also Lawrence, supra note 25,
at 1344 (noting flaws of clear and present danger doctrine exposed in Dennis); Redish, supra
note 27, at 1171-72 (discussing court's analysis in Dennis). See generally Radwan, supra note 28,
at 56-57 (discussing Dennis decision).
37 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509-11, 516 (applying balancing test, Court held Dennis' speech
could be prohibited given gravity of harm advocated, overthrow of government, and
likelihood of his speech inciting listener to act); see also Redish, supra note 27, at 1172 n.62
(recognizing if danger is serious, likelihood of its occurrence need only be minimal, whereas if
likelihood of occurrence is exceedingly great, seriousness of harm need not be so severe). See,
e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 814 F.2d 1017,1021 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing balancing
test); Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 93 (N.D. Texas 1978) (applying balancing test). See
generally Lawrence, supra note 25, at 1344 n.47 (discussing balancing test).
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C. Brandenburg v. Ohio
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,38 the Supreme Court announced the
modern test to be applied to cases involving infringement upon free
speech.39 Under this standard, a court must find that advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.40 Advocacy susceptible to
regulation must satisfy four elements: (1) direct advocacy of
unlawful action; 41 (2) directed or intended toward the goal of
inciting or producing lawless action; 42 (3) the likelihood that such
action would occur,43 and (4) that such occurrence was imminent.44
38 395 U.S. 444,446-47 (1969) (striking down conviction of Ku Klux Klan leader who made
speeches containing threats against national political leaders and hostile statements
concerning Blacks and Jews). Brandenburg was convicted under a state syndicalism statute
that prohibited "advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety or crime, sabotage, violence,
or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform."
Id. at 445. The Court found the statute unconstitutional because it criminalized mere
advocacy of violence as a means of achieving social and political change, without regard to
whether the speech was either intending or likely to incite imminent lawless action. Id. at 447.
39 See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1021 (discussing balancing test); see also Brill, supra note 4, at 987
(recognizing majority of courts apply Brandenburg analysis); Lawrence, supra note 25, at 1345
(stating Brandenburg best articulates current doctrine); Vansen, supra note 7, at 608 (noting
most courts apply Brandenburg).
40 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49 (noting failure to distinguish advocacy from
incitement abridges speech and press freedoms). See generally Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand
and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV.
719, 754-55 (1975) (arguing Brandenburg test is synthesis based upon Hands' Masses approach
and Holmes-Brandeis clear and present danger test); Linde, "Clear and Present Danger"
Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1185 (1970)
(discussing danger and incitement distinguished to overrule Vv7itney).
41 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (stating intent to advocate imminent
lawless action must be gleaned from 'import of language'); Lawrence, supra note 25, at 1346
(discussing direct incitement); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating advocacy of morally reprehensible evil short of incitement
not prohibitable); Kopech, supra note 25, at 182 (arguing "the simple act of expressly urging
idea or action, even violent or illegal action, without more, cannot be constitutionally
punished").
42 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (mandating specific
intent necessary to impose liability); see also Hess, 414 U.S. at 109 (stating no liability without
evidence that words intended to produce illegal action); Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024 (noting mere
negligence cannot form basis of liability for incitement). See generally Redish, supra note 27, at
1175-76 (discussing requirements of Brandenburg).
43 See Kopech, supra note 25, at 185 (distinguishing likelihood element, which addresses
necessity of finding high probability that feared action will actually come to fruition before
prohibition of the speech is justified, from imminence element, which consolidates concepts of
proximity of time and of place with an emphasis on importance of concluding the speech
represents legitimate danger).
44 See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108 (stating advocacy of future illegal action is insufficient to
impose liability); VWhitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (asserting remoteness of
danger is one factor in determining whether incitement is imminent); see also Hentoff, supra
note 28, at 1454-55 (discussing requirements of Brandenburg). See generally Radwan, supra note
28, at 59-60 (discussing imminence requirement).
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II. LEADING CASES INVOLVING MEDIA LIABILITY
Where recovery is sought for injuries allegedly resulting from
media speech, plaintiffs generally rest their claims on a tort theory
of negligence. 45 The majority of courts that hear such cases apply a
Brandenburg analysis.46 Therefore, in addition to satisfying the
elements of a tort cause of action, a plaintiff must survive the
scrutiny of the First Amendment.47 If the speech in question does
not fall into one of the above four categories of unprotected speech,
fighting words, obscenity, defamation or speech which is likely to
incite imminent lawless action, courts are reluctant to find liability
and recovery will almost always be barred.48
These cases can generally be placed into one of four categories: (1)
"exhortation" cases; (2) "instruction" cases; (3) "facilitation" cases;
and (4) "inspiration" cases.49
45 See Day, supra note 8, at 74 (discussing negligence theory); see also Smith, supra note 7,
at 1196 (discussing negligence theory and First Amendment).
46 See, e.g., Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023 (denying recovery to survivors of teenager due to
absence of incitement under Brandentnrg in magazine article describing autoerotic
asphyxiation); Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (finding no incitement
under Brandenburg, therefore liability barred); McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (denying liability to record producer for suicide that allegedly resulted from
lyrics of record, holding no intent to produce imminent lawless action); Olivia N. v. NBC, 178
Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding no liability for network where televised
portrayal of simulated rape was imitated by group of teenagers); Yakubowicz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (holding no liability due to absence of
incitement under Brandenburg where gang imitated violent scene portrayed in film); Smith v.
Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding insufficient incitement under
Brandenburg).
47 See Vansen, supra note 7, at 610 (proposing reworking of Brandenburg standard); see also
Crump, supra note 16, at 52-54 (1994) (suggesting case-by-case analysis); Sims, supra note 5, at
282 (proposing balancing test); Smith, supra note 7, at 1195 (arguing for application of
traditional negligence theory).
48 See Day, supra note 8, at 73 (noting that if speech does not fall into one of unprotected
categories, liability is barred); see also Quinlan and Persels, supra note 8, at 435 (recognizing
that speech not satisfying Brandenburg requirements should be accorded First Amendment
protection).
49 See Sims, supra note 5, at 235. Professor Sims categorizes media liability cases into four
categories: (1) "instruction cases," where the injuries allegedly arose from media speech
offering instructions for inherently dangerous activities, or where the activity was made
dangerous because the instructions were erroneous; (2) "exhortation cases," where the
defendants actively encouraged or exhorted the plaintiffs to get involved in obviously
dangerous, reckless or unlawful activity and injury resulted from that involvement; (3)
"facilitation cases," where violence against a third party was purportedly facilitated by
information provided by the media defendants; and (4) "inspiration cases," where the
plaintiff's injuries allegedly results from violence or dangerous activity inspired by the media
speech. Id.
[Vol. 15:187
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A. Exhortation Cases
An "exhortation" case is one where the defendants actively
encouraged or exhorted the plaintiffs to become involved in
obviously dangerous, reckless or unlawful activity; and injury
results from such involvement. 50
1. Davidson v. Time Warner 51
On April 11, 1992, Ronald Ray Howard, a nineteen-year old black
male, sped down a Texas highway in a stolen Chevy Blazer with rap
music blaring from the windows. As a result of the loud music,
Howard was stopped by state trooper Bill Davidson.52 When
Howard was asked to produce a driver's license, he fatally shot
Officer Davidson with a nine millimeter Glock handgun.5 3 At the
time of the shooting, Howard was listening to a cassette entitled
2Pacalypse Now, which is a recording performed by Tupac Amaru
Shakur.54 Davidson's widow brought suit against Shakur and his
record producers claiming the lyrics were intended to incite young
black males to kill policemen. 55 In an attempt to avoid the death
50 See Sims, supra note 5, at 239. See, e.g., McColla, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 188. In McColumn, the
plaintiffs brought an action against Ozzy Osbourne and CBS Records for $9 million in
punitive damages when their nineteen-year old son shot himself in the head after repeatedly
listening to Osbourne's song Suicide Solution. See id. at 189. Consequently, the plaintiffs allege
that Osbourne's music was the proximate cause of their son's suicide. See id. at 191. The court,
applying a Brandenburg analysis, reasoned that there is nothing in any of Osbourne's songs
which could be interpreted as an inducement to an act of suicide by a listener. See id. at 193.
No rational person would mistake musical lyrics and poetry for literal commands or
directives to immediate action; to support such a conclusion would indulge a fiction which
neither common sense nor the First Amendment will permit. See id. at 194. Furthermore, the
court stated, it is simply not acceptable to a free and democratic society to impose a duty upon
performing artists to limit and restrict their creativity in order to avoid the dissemination of
ideas in artistic speech which may adversely affect emotionally troubled individuals. See id. at
197. Therefore, the court dismissed the suit, concluding that the First Amendment posed an
absolute bar to the plaintiff's claim. See id. at 188.
51 No. V-94-006, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *4 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 31, 1997).
52 See Davidson, No. V-94-006, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *4 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 31, 1997).
See generally Orozco v. Dallas Morning News, 975 S.W.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing
liability of newspaper where plaintiff's were gunned down at their home by gang members).
53 See id. at *4.
54 See id. The Davidsons do not allege which song Howard was listening to at the time of
the shooting. Id. at *4 n.4. At least one song on the album makes reference to commission of
violence against police officers containing the following lyrics: "Now I could be a crooked
nigga too. When I'm rolling with my crew, watch what crooked niggas do. I got a nine
millimeter Glock pistol...I fired 13 shots and popped another clip.. .The more I shot, the more
mothaf- ka's dropped, and even cops got shot when they rolled up." Id. at *4 n.4.
55 See id. at *6. The Davidsons also claim that the album is obscene, contains "fighting
words", and defames peace officers like Officer Davidson. Id. The plaintiffs claim that because
the record lacks constitutional protection, the defendants are liable for producing violent
music that proximately caused the death of Officer Davidson. Id.
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penalty, Howard contended that the song and its lyrics "incited"
him to shoot the officer.56 The jury did not accept such a defense and
sentenced Howard to death.57
In evaluating the liability of the record producers of 2Pacalypse
Now, the court employed the Brandenburg analysis and held that
2Pacalypse Now does not incite imminent violence.58 The court
reasoned that it was far more likely that Howard, a gang member
driving a stolen automobile, feared arrest, and shot Officer
Davidson to avoid capture.59 After more than 400,000 sales of
2Pacalyspe Now, the case at bar is the only one alleging that the song
incites listeners to commit violence against police officers,
suggesting that the chances of such incitement are quite low. 60 The
court added that the murder of Officer Davidson was an irrational
and illegal act, whereupon the defendants are not necessarily bound
to foresee and plan against such conduct.61 Moreover, the burden of
preventing the harm is very high, both to the defendants and to
society at large, because of the profound and adverse affects on
56 See id. at *4; Waller v. Osboume, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1145 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (claiming
defendant musician's lyrics directed plaintiff to commit suicide).
57 See id. at *5. See generally Vance v. Judas Priest, No. 86-5844/86-3939 (D.C. Nev., Aug.
24,1990) (discussing liability based on subliminal messages).
58 See Davidson, No. V-94-006, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *62 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 31, 1997)
(recognizing most courts rely upon Brandenburg's "incitement" analysis when addressing
media violence); see also Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1150 (analyzing Ozzy Osbourne's song Suicide
Solution under Brandenburg); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App.3d 989, 1000 (1988)
(applying Brandenburg to Suicide Solution); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536
N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (holding violent film did not incite gang violence for purposes
of Brandenburg).
59 See Davidson, No. V-94-006, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21599, at *66 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 31, 1997)
("Courts addressing similar issues have repeatedly refused to find musical recording or
broadcast incited certain conduct merely because certain acts occurred after the speech."). See
generally Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1146 (refusing to hold that conduct has direct link to music);
McColluin, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1000 (holding that lyrics did not constitute incitement).
60 See Davidson, No V-94-006, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21599, at *40 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 31, 1997)
(stating fact that music is violent and offensive is not sole factor when deciding foreseeability);
see also DeFillippo v. NBC, 446 A.2d 1036, 1041 (R.I. 1982) (finding plaintiff was only person
who alleged emulating action portrayed during broadcast and stating that "[i]n such a case,
we cannot say that the broadcast constituted incitement"); McCullough v. Amstar Corp., 833
S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. App. 1992) (affirming summary judgment when evidence established
that plaintiff was first person who suffered injury as result of exposure to steepwater fumes at
defendants' facility).
61 See Davidson, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *40 (holding that homicide of Officer Davidson
was not random act of violence against peace officer, but attempt to elude justice by adult
gang member driving stolen automobile); see also Peek v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc., 768
S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. App. 1989) (stating one is not bound to anticipate negligent or unlawful
conduct on part of another). See generally Williams v. Sun Valley Hosp., 723 S.W.2d 783, 787
(Tex. App. 1987) (refusing to impose liability for unpredictable conduct of patient with mental
disorder). But see Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1996) (noting that
governmental entity is entitled to sovereign immunity and actions did not constitute waiver
under Texas Tort Claims Act).
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B. Instruction Cases
An "instruction" case may be described as one where the
plaintiff's injuries allegedly arose as a result of media speech
offering instructions for inherently dangerous activities, or where
the activity was made dangerous because the instructions were
erroneous.
63
1. Smith v. Linn64
In January of 1977, Patricia Smith purchased a copy of Dr. Linn's
book entitled When All Else Fails... The Last Chance Diet.65 After
following the books instructions for weight loss, she had lost over
100 pound by June 1977 when she died from cardiac failure.66 The
administrator of her estate brought an action to recover for the death
of the decedent, alleging her death was caused by the liquid protein
62 See Davidson, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *37 (stating that to create duty requiring
defendants to police their recordings would be "enormously expensive and 
would result in
sale of only most bland, least controversial music" and would further lead to self censorship).
See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (stating that music is form
of expression and communication protected under First Amendment); Betts v. McCaughtry,
827 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (asserting that "it is undisputed that rap music
constitutes speech protected by First Amendment"), afd, 19 F.3d 21 (7th Cir. 1994).
63 See Sims, supra note 5, at 243; see, e.g., Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publ'ns, Inc., 833
P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992). Fodor's is a publisher of travel guides and has published over 700
different titles since 1949. See id. at 73. The Birmingham's bought a copy of Fodor's publication
as a guide for their honeymoon in Hawaii. Based on information obtained from the guide, the
Birmingham's decided to visit Kekaha Beach. See id. Consequently, Joseph Birmingham
sustained personal injuries from body surfing in ocean waters off Kekaha Beach. See id. at 75.
As a result of this injury, the Birmingham's brought suit against Fodor's alleging that Fodor's
was negligent in their failure to warn of the existing dangerous conditions, which the
Birmingham's alleged was the proximate cause of their injuries. In its analysis, the court
began by stating that "no jurisdiction has held a publisher liable in negligence for personal
injury suffered in reliance upon information contained in the publication, unless such
publisher 'authored' or 'guaranteed' the information." See id. Since Fodor's is neither the
author of the Guide, nor guarantees the contents of its publication, the court concluded that
Fodor's did not owe a duty to warn the Birmingham's of the accuracy of the contents of the
Guide. See id. at 83.
64 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal granted, 575 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1990), affd, 587 A.2d
568 (Pa. 1991). See generally Daniel McNeel Lane, Jr., Publisher Liability for Material That Invites
Reliance, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1988) (discussing tort liability of publishers).
65 See Smith, 563 A.2d at 125 (noting she followed diet under care of her physician, also
defendant in this suit). See generally Roy W. Arnold, The Persistence of Caveat Emnptor: Publisher
lnmnunitij From Liability For Inaccurate Factnal Information, 53 U. PIrr. L. REV. 777, 789 (1992)
(discussing last chance diet).
66 See Smith, 563 A.2d at 125; see also Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263,
1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding publisher not liable for injuries to plaintiff resulting from
reliance on how-to book on making tools).
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regimen as provided in the book.67 The plaintiff argued that the
book should not be granted First Amendment protection because it
was an "incitement to immediate unreflecting action such as the
action arising from shouting 'Fire!' in a crowded theater." 68 The
court disagreed, refusing to hold the publisher liable for
negligence. 69
C. Facilitation Cases
Facilitation cases can be characterized where violence against a
third party is allegedly facilitated by information provided by the
media defendant. 70
67 See Smith, 563 A.2d at 125; see also Hartford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moorhead, 578 A.2d 492,
493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (attempting to hold defendant publisher liable for negligent failure to
warn).
68 See Smith, 563 A.2d at 125. See generally Barden v. Harper Collins, 863 F. Supp. 41, 42
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 1994) (discussing tort liability as applied to publishers).
69 See Smith, 563 A.2d at 127 (holding that diet book is protected under First Amendment);
see also Winter v. G.P. Putnam Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding defendant
publisher not liable where plaintiffs were allegedly injured as result of information contained
in publisher's book); Mackown v. Ill. Publ'g and Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526, 526 (11. App. Ct.
1937) (holding newspaper publisher not liable for injuries resulting from reader's use of
reproduced dandruff formula). But see Brocklesby v. U.S., 767 F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 1985)
(finding publisher negligent in publishing graphic flight chart based on erroneous
government information which allegedly caused plane crash).
70 See Sims, supra note 5, at 243. See, e.g., Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880
F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989). Eimann was a wrongful death action brought by the mother and son
of a murder victim. See id. at 831. John Wayne Hearn shot and killed Sandra Black at the order
of her husband for the amount of $10,000. See id. Her husband, Robert Black, contacted Hearn
through an ad he ran in Soldier of Fortune Magazine, a publication that focuses on mercenary
activities and military affairs. In the advertisement, Hearn described himself as an ex-marine,
Vietnam veteran, and weapons specialist, and offered his services for "high risk assignments,
U.S. or overseas." The plaintiffs won a $9.4 million jury verdict against Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc. See id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the jury verdict and rendered
judgment in favor of Soldier of Fortune. The Court of Appeals did not address Soldier of
Fortune's First Amendment defense, holding that Soldier of Fortune could not be held liable
under Texas negligence law. See id. at 834. The court affirmatively held that Soldier of Fortune
owed no duty to refrain from publishing a facially innocuous advertisement, since the ad's
context was ambiguous. See id. at 834 n.1. Applying a risk-utility analysis, the court reasoned
that because of the pervasiveness of advertising in our society and its importance to free
expression, it would be a disproportionate burden to require publishers to decline all
advertisement for products or services that might pose a threat of harm. See id. at 837. But see
Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992). In Braun, Bruce
Gastwirth hired Richard Savage to murder his business associate Richard Braun, through a
"Gun for Hire" advertisement which Savage had placed in Soldier of Fortune Magazine. Savage
and another individual went to Braun's suburban home, shot Braun to death and injured his
sixteen year old son, Michael. See id. A wrongful death action was brought by Michael and an
older brother against Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. See id. The District Court found that
Savage's advertisement, which specifically stated "Gun for Hire", unlike the more ambiguous
advertisement in Eimnann, subjected the public to a clear risk of harm. See id. at 1113. Applying
a risk/benefits balancing test, the court concluded that the likelihood and gravity ot the
possible harm that may result from an advertisement which offers a "Gun for Hire"
outweighed the social utility of advertising such criminal activity. See id. 1114.
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1. Way v. Boy Scouts of America
In Way v. Boy Scouts of America71 a twelve-year old boy, Rocky
Miller, was killed when the rifle that he and several friends were
playing with accidentally discharged.72 After reading a 16-page
advertising supplement on shooting sports in Boys' Life magazine,73
the children located an old rifle and a .22 caliber cartridge, which
was accidentally fired, killing Rocky. 74 The child's mother sued the
magazine for the death of her son, basing her action on the theories
of negligence and strict products liability.75 She alleged that her son
was motivated to experiment with the rifle and cartridge as a direct
result of the supplemental edition to the magazine. 76
The court flatly rejected the plaintiff's negligence claim,
concluding that Rocky's experimentation with the rifle was not a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the supplement.77
Furthermore, Rocky was unsupervised, while the supplement
emphasized the importance of supervision and safe and responsible
71 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993). See generally Arnold, supra note 65, at 778 (discussing
tort liability of publishers for injuries resulting from inaccurate information); Lisa A. Powe,
Products Liability and the First Ainendmnent: The Liability of Publishers for Failure to Warn, 59 IND.
L.J. 503, 504 (1985) (discussing publisher negligence in context of products liability).
72 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 232; see also Suarez v. Underwood, 426 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209-11
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (rejecting claims against newspaper that ran ad for dangerous hair
implant system). See generally Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers and Product's Liability: Remedies for
Defective Infonnation in Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1998) (discussing tort liability and
book publishers).
73 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 232. The supplement supplied information about earning merit
badges for shooting, the Presidential Sports Award and Olympic sport shooting as well as a
checklist on firearm safety. Id.
74 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 232; see also Libertelli v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., No. 80 Civ. 56-
26, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11049, (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing tort claim against publisher of
Physician's Desk Reference for failing to warn of Valium's addictive nature).
75 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 232; see also Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1974) (finding publisher not liable for implied warranty of fireworks advertised in
magazine). See generally Gary T. Schwartz, inplications For Product's Liability: New Products, Old
Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 796 (1983) (discussing overview
of products liability law); John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort
Lazo, 85 MiCH. L. REV. 1820, 1821 (1987) (discussing tort liability of media).
76 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 236 (noting that foreseeability provides touchstone in
determining whether circumstances give rise to duty); see also Mellon Mortgage Company v.
Holder, 1999 Tex. Lexis 107, 1, 4-5 (Tex. 1999) (discussing two part foreseeability test in
negligence causes of action); see also Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523,
525 (Tex. 1990) (discussing significance of foreseeability in negligence actions); see also El
Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987) (discussing element of duty in
negligence cause of action).
77 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 236 (discussing foreseeability of accident); see also Yanase v.
Auto. Club of S. Cal., 260 Cal. Rptr. 513, 514-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting negligence
claims against publisher of tour book recommending hotel where plaintiff's husband was
shot).
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gun use.78 The supplement provided useful information about
lawful products which the court deemed to be of significant social
utility.7 9 Moreover, the court recognized the pervasive and
important role of advertising in society.80 Weighing the risk,
foreseeability, and likelihood of injury, against the social utility of
the conduct, the court concluded that the firearms supplement did
not create a duty on the part of the publisher to either refrain from
publishing the supplement or add warnings about the danger of
firearms and ammunition.81
The court also rejected the plaintiff's strict liability claim that the
information contained in the supplement made the magazine a
defective product.82 The court recognized that the very essence of a
strict liability cause of action under §§ 402A or 402B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts is the existence of a product within the
meaning of that section.83 Ideas and information are intangible
characteristics, not tangible properties.84  To illustrate this
distinction, the court quoted a Ninth Circuit opinion: "A book
78 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 236 (noting supplement emphasized supervision and use of
firearms in structured environment, not as experiment).
79 See id.
80 See id.; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (stating "as to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow
of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day's most urgent political debate"); Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d
830, 838 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting importance of advertising in society); Walters v. Seventeen
Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1122 (Cal. App. 1987) (noting Supreme Court's continued
linkage of commercial speech to First Amendment protection).
81 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 237 (stating balance of guarding against risk of harm, actual risk
of harm presented, and burden of preventing harm weighs in favor of defendant); see also
Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La. 1987) (holding defendant had no
duty because burden would be too onerous); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (balancing societal interest, severity of risk, burden on defendant, and likelihood
of occurrence, concluding defendant publisher had no duty to warn of defective ideas in its
book).
82 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 238 (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A
which provides that: "(1) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property .. "); see also Walter v.
Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding science book is not defective
product giving rise to strict liability in tort).
83 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 239 (noting plaintiff is not complaining about physical property
of supplement, but rather alleging ideas and information in magazine encouraged children to
engage in activities that were dangerous).
84 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 239; see also Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1216-
17 (D. Md. 1988) (holding publisher of nursing textbook not liable for physical harm to
nursing student under theory of either negligence or strict liability); Cardozo v. True, 342 So.
2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 1977) (distinguishing between tangible and intangible portions of books;
holding warranty applies to tangible portion but not to ideas); John A. Gray, Strict Liability for
Dissemination of Dangerous lnfonnation, 82 L. LIBR. J. 497, 497-98 (1990) (discussing whether
information is product or service).
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containing Shakespeare's sonnets consists of two parts, the material
and the print therein, and the ideas and expression thereof. The first
may be a product, but the second is not."8 5 The court concluded that
the ideas, thoughts, words, and information conveyed by the
magazine and the supplement did not constitute a product.86
D. Inspiration Cases
"Inspiration" cases involve plaintiffs who are allegedly injured as
a result of violence of dangerous activity inspired by the media
speech.87
85 Way, 856 S.W.2d at 239 (quoting Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th
Cir. 1991).
86 See Way, 856 S.W.2d at 239; see also Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034
(9th Cir. 1991) (noting that because "how-to" book contains only thought and expression, it
cannot be basis for products liability action); Garcia v. Kusan, 655 N.E.2d 1290, 1293-94 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1995) (stating products liability is limited to tangible portion of book but not to
ideas).
87 See Sims, supra note 5, at 243; see, e.g., Olivia N. v. Nat' Broad. Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981). Suit arose from a copy-cat sexual assault after NBC broadcast the film
"Born Innocent" which contained a dramatization of an adolescent girl being assaulted in a
shower of a state-run home by four other girls using the handle of a bathroom plunger. See id.
at 491. Four days after the film's broadcast, the plaintiff, a nine-year-old girl, was "artificially
raped" with a bottle by minors at a San Francisco beach. She brought suit against NBC
claiming she suffered physical and psychological damage as proximate result of the telecast.
The plaintiff argued that negligence liability could constitutionally be imposed despite the
absence of proof of incitement as defined in Brandenburg. See id. at 492. The California Court of
Appeals disagreed, stating that incitement is the proper test. See id. at 494. Since the television
broadcast failed to meet the requirements of Brandenburg, the court concluded that imposing
liability on simple negligence theory would frustrate vital freedom of speech guarantees. See
id. at 496. The deterrent effect of subjecting the television networks to negligence liability
because of their programming would lead to self-censorship, which would dampen the vigor
and limit variety of public debate. See id. at 494. In 1982, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
held that the First Amendment barred suit against a television station that broadcast a
"Johnny Carson Show" featuring a stuntman- who "hanged" Carson. See DeFillipo v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036, 1037-38 (R.I. 1982). In DeFillipo, the parents of a thirteen-year-old
boy sued NBC for wrongful death, after their son, imitating the stunt he had seen on the
Carson show, hanged himself. See id. at 1037. The plaintiffs alleged that the network had been
negligent in broadcasting the stunt. See id. at 1038. The appellate court affirmed a lower court
decision granting summary judgment for the network after finding that the incitement
standard of Brandenburg would be the only exception to the First Amendment protection
under which plaintiffs could maintain this action. See id. at 1040. The court held that since the
broadcast provided an explicit warning not to try the stunt, it had not advocated any harmful
conduct, and therefore, did not constitute incitement. See id. at 1041-42. The court reasoned
that permitting liability, despite the warning, would invariably lead to self censorship by
broadcasters to remove any matter that may be emulated and lead to a law suit. See id. at 1041.
Such self-censorship is not only violative of the defendant's right to make programming
decisions, but also violative of the "paramount rights of the viewers to suitable access to
Isocial, esthetics, moral, and other ideas and experience."' See id. at 1041-42.
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1. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine 88
In its August 1981 issue, as part of a series about the pleasures
and dangers of unusual and taboo sexual practices, Hustler
Magazine printed an article entitled "Orgasm of Death" discussing
the practice of autoerotic asphyxia.89 Troy D., a fourteen-year old
boy, obtained a copy of the August 1981 issue and attempted the
practice.90 The next morning, his body was found, hanging in his
closet, a copy of the magazine was found near his feet.91 The
plaintiffs, Troy's mother and the close friend who found the body,
argued that the Hustler article was directed to inciting or producing
Troy's death.92 The court held that "even if the article paints in
glowing terms the pleasures supposedly achieved by the practice it
describes.. .no fair reading of it can make its content advocacy, let
alone incitement to engage in the practice." 93
88 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
89 See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1018. This practice entails masturbation while "hanging" oneself
in order to temporarily cut off the blood supply to the brain at the moment of orgasm. Id. An
editor's note, positioned to ensure the reader would see it, read: "Hustler emphasizes the
often fatal dangers of the practice of 'auto-erotic asphyxia'. . DO NOT ATITEMPT' this
method. The facts presented are solely for educational purposes". Id. The article began with a
vivid description of the tragic result the practice may create, specifically, that as may as 1,000
United States teenagers die in this manner each year. Id. The two-page article warned readers
"at least ten different times that the practice is dangerous, self-destructive and deadly." Id.
Furthermore, "auto-asphyxia is one form of sex play you try only if you're anxious to wind up
in cold storage with a coroner's tag on your big toe." id. at 1019.
90 See id. at 1019.
91 See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1019.
92 See id. The plaintiffs also alleged that Hustler was responsible for Troy's death on
grounds of negligence, products liability, dangerous instrumentality and attractive nuisance.
Id. Plaintiffs also sought to recover damages for emotional and psychological harms suffered
as a result of Troy's death, as well as exemplary damages. Id. In order for plaintiffs to prevail,
they would have to prove, "1. Auto-erotic asphyxiation is a lawless act. 2. Hustler advocated
this act. 3. Hustler's publication went even beyond 'mere advocacy' and amount to
incitement. 4. The incitement was directed to imminent action". Id at 1022.
93 Id. at 1022-23. Plaintiffs argued in the alternative for a less stringent standard then
Brandenburg "in cases involving non-political speech that has actually produced harm." Id. at
1024. The court declined to do so, stating "the Supreme Court generally has not attempted to
differentiate between different categories of protected speech ... [s]uch an endeavor would
not only be hopelessly complicated but would raise substantial concern that the worthiness of
speech might be judged by majoritarian notions of political and social propriety and
morality." Id. See also Walt Disney v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, 580 (Ga. 1981) (dismissing
plaintiff's claim that program caused plaintiffs son to be injured when son imitated
experiment performed on program). See generally Bill v. Superior Ct. City and County of San
Francisco, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1003 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1982) (dismissing plaintiff's claim
that producer of gang violence film was liable for shooting of plaintiff's daughter by third
party shortly after viewing film).
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2. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System 94
In Zamora, the plaintiff, Ronny Zamora, a fifteen year old, shot
and killed his 85 year old neighbor.95 Zamora, together with his
parents, sued ABC, CBS and NBC alleging that Ronny had become
involuntarily "addicted to and completely subliminally intoxicated"
by the extensive viewing of violence offered by the defendants.96
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their duty to use
ordinary care to prevent Ronny Zamora from being "impermissibly
stimulated, incited and instigated" to imitate the atrocities he saw
on television.97 The complaint further alleged that he had been
"deprived of his liberty and imprisoned; ha[d] developed a
sociopathic personality and [could not] lead a normal life."98
The court held that there is a prevailing right of the public to have
broad access to programming as well as a right of broadcasters to
disseminate uninhibited by those members of the public who are
particularly sensitive.99 Permitting such liability "would place
broadcasters in jeopardy for televising Hamlet, Julius Caesar,
Grimm's Fairy Tales.. .and even The Holocaust."100 The court found
that the complaint was so devoid of guidance and so lacking in a
showing of legal cause that it was dismissed.101
94 480 F. Supp. 199 (D.C. Fla. 1979).
95 See Zainora, 480 F. Supp. at 200. The complaint did not allege the circumstances under
which the shooting took place. Id.
96 See Zainora, 480 F. Supp. at 200. But cf. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., et al. v. Olivia Niemi, 434
U.S. 1354 (alleging injury resulted from specific program not reaction to general viewing);
Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (Mass. 1989) (alleging that
violence resulted from specific movie, not viewing in general).
97 See Zainora, 480 F. Supp. at 200. It was further charged that plaintiff developed a
sociopathic personality, became desensitized to violent behavior and became a danger to
himself and others. Id.
98 Id. The complaint also alleged that both parents have sustained certain losses for which
they may recover. Id.
99 ld at 205. To permit such a claim presents a situation which would "give birth to a legal
morass through which broadcasting would have difficulty finding its way." Id. at 206. The
Court notes that this right of the public is tantamount over the right of broadcasters. Id at 205.
For a discussion of Congress' power to regulate broadcaster versus the public's First
Amendment right to receive information, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969). In Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978), the Court held that applying
contemporary community standards ensure that material would be judged by its impact on
the average person rather than a particularly sensitive individual.
100 Id. at 206 (stating imposition of duty claimed would discriminate among television
productions on basis of content which is impermissible under Constitution); see also Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975) (holding that ban on movies containing
nudity impermissibly distinguished such movies from all other movies). But cf Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (noting that states could enact time, manner, and place
restrictions on speech irrespective of content).
101 See Zainora, 480 F. Supp. at 203. The court noted that the minor's alleged voracious
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III. RICE V. PALADIN ENTERPRISES
A. District Court
"It is my opinion that the professional hit man fills a need in
society ...... But few have the courage or knowledge to make that
dream a reality.. .The kill is the easiest part of the job... [If you
decide to kill your victim with a knife, the knife... should have a six-
inch blade with a serrated edge for making efficient, quiet
kills.. .[You might also use an ice pick to murder your victim].. .An
ice pick can... be driven into the victim's brain, through the
ear.. .When using a small caliber weapon like the 22, it is best to
shoot from a distance of three to six feet... aim for the
head... preferably the eye sockets... [In order to dispose of a
corpse], you can simply cut off the head after burying the
body.. .take the head to some deserted location.. .and blow the
telltale dentition to smithereens... [Or] you can always cut the body
into sections and pack it into an ice chest for transport and disposal
at various spots around the countryside.. .After you have arrived at
home the events that took place take on a dreamlike quality..." 102
On March 3, 1993, James Perry murdered Mildred Horn, her eight
year old quadriplegic son, Trevor Horn, and the child's nurse, Janice
Sanders.103 Perry was hired by Lawrence Horn, Mildred's husband,
who wanted his son dead, so that he could obtain the $2 million
settlement his son received for the injuries that left him paralyzed
for life.104 On January 24, 1992, Perry ordered 2 books from Paladin
Enterprises mail order catalogue; Hit Man: A Technical Manual for
Independent Contractors and Hoz to Make a Silencer, both of which he
consulted in the perpetration of the murders.105 The plaintiffs
brought this wrongful death and survival action against Paladin
Enterprises, the publisher of the two books, claining that the
intake of violence was on a voluntary basis, and with his parents apparent acquiescence. Id. at
202. The First Amendment casts a heavy burden on those who seek to censor, and the
plaintiffs' complaint wholly fails to allege any specific broadcasting conduct which is
unprotected because it incited Zamora to shoot and kill his neighbor. Id. at 206.
102 Selected passages from REX FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (Paladin Enters., Inc. 1983). The author of this book is actually a
woman who has remained unidentified. Thirteen thousand copies have been sold nationally.
See also 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1997).
103 See Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 839 (D. Md. 1996).
104 See id.
105 See id.
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defendants aided and abetted the murders of the three decedents by
publishing these books.106
Paladin's marketing strategy was intended to attract and assist
criminals who needed information on how to commit murders.1 07
Paladin has stipulated that it intended and had knowledge that their
publications would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and
potential criminals to plan and execute the crime of murder for hire,
in the manner set forth in the publications.108
The plaintiffs argued that Paladin's books are not protected by the
First Amendment for two reasons. First, they argued that the First
Amendment does not protect communications that aid and abet the
commission of a crime.1 09 Second, plaintiffs argued that Paladin's
books are unprotected as inciteful speech.10
The District Court noted that if the Court found that Hit Man was
protected by the First Amendment, the plaintiffs are barred from
maintaining any tort claims against Paladin111 The court rejected
the argument that speech which aids and abets a crime is not
protected under the First Amendment.1 2 The court reasoned that
the theory of aiding and abetting has never been applied in cases
involving the media.113 Since the theory of aiding and abetting has
never been used in this context, the court held that it could not
extend the theory to media defendants, nor could the court create a
new category of unprotected speech, i.e., speech that aids and abets
murder."14
The court proceeded to apply the Brandenburg analysis.115 The
106 See id. at 838.
107 See id. at 840. All parties agree that Paladin's marketing strategy was intended to
maximize sales to the public including authors who desire such information for the purpose
of writing books about crime and criminals, law enforcement officers and agencies who seek
information concerning the means and methods of committing crimes, people who enjoy
reading about crime for entertainment purposes, and criminologists and others who study
criminal methods and mentality. Id.
108 See id.
109 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841.
110 See id.
111 See id. at 840. The court stated that "the First Amendment bars the imposition of civil
liability on Paladin unless Hit Mani falls within one of the well defined and narrowly limited
classes that are unprotected by the First Amendment." [d.
112 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 842. The court recognized the absence of any reported decision
suggesting that Maryland extends the tort of aiding and abetting to the circumstances of this
case. Id.
113 See id. at 842-43 (asserting that cases which have involved such theory are distinct
from facts of this case).
114 Seeid.at842.
115 See id. at 845-46. The court rejected plaintiffs argument that the 'actual malice'
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court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Brandenburg only applies
in cases dealing with issues of social or political concern, stating that
the standard is not inherently limited to political speech.116 The
court concluded that Paladin's book did not constitute "incitement"
as provided by Brandenburg.117 Although Paladin may have
intended that the manual be used by criminals, it did not intend for
Perry to murder the three decedents in the case.118 Moreover, the
murders were conmitted a year after Perry received the books. 119
The court also found that the book did not constitute "a call to
action."120 Rather, the book merely teaches what must be done to
implement a professional hit, and does not cross the line between
permissible advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or
violence.121 The court held that while the books may be deemed
"reprehensible and void of any significant redeeming social value",
the books were nonetheless entitled to full First Amendment
protection and granted summary judgment in favor of Paladin.122
B. Circuit Court
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Paladin
Enterprises may be liable for aiding and abetting the triple
standard developed in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was applicable. Id. at
844.
116 See Id. at 846 (recognizing vast majority of cases have found Brandenburg was
applicable); see, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987)
(denying recovery to survivors of deceased teenager due to absence of incitement in magazine
article describing autoerotic asphyxiation under Brandenburg); Zamora v. CBS, Inc., 480 F.
Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (finding no incitement under Brandenburg, therefore liability
barred); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193-195 (1988) (denying liability to record
producer for suicide that allegedly resulted from lyrics of record on grounds that there was no
intent to produce imminent lawless action); Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888,
893 (1981) (holding no liability for network where televised portrayal of simulated rape was
imitated by group of teenagers); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067,
1071 (Mass. 1989) (holding that producer had no liability where gang imitated violent scene
portrayed in film due to absence of incitement under Brandenburg); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d
123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding insufficient incitement under Brandenburg).
117 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 846.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See id. (stating book does not purport to order or command anyone to any concrete
action at any specific time, much less immediately).
121 See id. (citing Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 97-98 (1961)) (noting that mere
abstract teaching of moral propriety or even moral necessity of resort to force and violence is
not same as preparing group for violent action and steering it to such action).
122 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 849 (stating however loathsome one characterizes publication,
Hit Man simply does not fall within parameters of any of recognized exceptions to general
First Amendment principles of freedom of speech).
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homicide. 123 At the outset, the parties stipulated that the sole issue
to be decided by the Court was whether the First Amendment was a
complete defense, as a matter of law.124 Paladin has stipulated not
only that, in marketing Hit Man, Paladin "intended to attract and
assist criminals and would-be criminals who desire information on
how to commit crimes", but also that it assisted Perry in the
perpetration of the murders that are the subject matter of this
case. 125 The court recognized that at all relevant times, Paladin
possessed no specific knowledge that either: (1) Perry or Horn
planned to commit a crime; (2) Perry or Horn had entered into a
conspiracy for the purpose of committing a crime; or (3) Perry had
been retained by Horn to murder the three decedents.126
The court began its analysis by stating that spoken or written
words which constitute criminal or civil aiding and abetting does
not enjoy protection under the First Amendment.127 The court
assumed that speech acts which the government may criminally
prosecute without concern for the First Amendment, may also be
subject to civil penalty. 128 Therefore, the court reasoned that the
First Amendment would not pose a bar to a finding that Paladin is
civilly liable for aiding and abetting Perry's triple contract
murder.129
The circuit court suggested that a First Amendment instruction
would only be needed where the speech was of abstract generality,
which is distinct from advice to commit a specific criminal act.130
123 See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
124 See id. at 241.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 241 n.2.
127 See id. at 244 (citing United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982). See generally
S.E.C. v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d. Cir. 1984) (discussing aiding and abetting); U.S. v. Nolan, 718
F.2d 589 (3d. Cir. 1982) (discussing use of aiding and abetting); U.S. v. Percuoco, 630 F. Supp.
784, 784 (D. Mass. 1986) (discussing criminal andcivil aiding and abetting).
128 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 247. See generally U.S. v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1002-03 (5th Cir.
1987) (discussing aiding and abetting); U.S. v. Graewe, 774 F.2d 106, 107 (6th Cir. 1985)
(discussing same).
129 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 243. See generally Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 45-46 (1982)
(rejecting First Amendment defense when activity sought to be protect was illegal); Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 491 (1949) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
injunction forbidding union members from picketing to support illegal business
arrangement).
130 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 245 (citing U. S. v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 551-52 (9th Cir. 1985)).
See generally Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203, 235 (1961) (discussing theoretical advocacy); Yates v.
U.S., 354 U.S. 298, 320 (1957) (discussing concept of principles divorced from action); U.S. v.
Fleschner, 98 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating First Amendment is not defense to tax fraud);
U.S. v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970) (stating speech not protected by First
Amendment when it is very vehicle of crime itself).
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The court further stated that Brandenburg's imminence requirement
generally poses little obstacle to the punishment of speech that
constitutes criminal aiding and abetting, because culpability in such
cases is premised not on the speaker's advocacy of criminal conduct,
but on the speaker's successful efforts to assist others by providing
detailed means of accomplishing the crime.131
The court found that a heightened standard of intent would be
satisfied, since Paladin had stipulated that they intended the manual
to be used by criminals.132 Moreover, the court believed that even
without such stipulations a jury could infer the requisite intent.133
In summary, the circuit court concluded that Paladin's
astonishing stipulations134  coupled with the extraordinary
comprehensiveness, detail and clarity of Hit Man's instructions for
murder, and the book's lack of legitimate purpose, would allow a
reasonable jury to find Paladin liable for aiding and abetting Perry's
triple homicide.1 35
C. Implications of Rice
The Circuit Court's decision in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.136
represents a departure from the analysis traditionally applied by
courts addressing cases involving media liability. First, the Rice
decision provides plaintiffs with an additional cause of action,
namely, civil aiding and abetting.137 Most cases seeking recovery for
injuries allegedly resulting from media speech have been premised
131 See Rice,128 F.3d at 246. See generaliy U.S. v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1978)(discussing aiding and abetting).
132 See id. at 248.
133 See id. at 252. The court concluded that a jury could draw such inferences from: the
powerful prose and imperative voice, the fact that Perry's methods and tactics closely
paralleled that of Hit Man, the purpose of the book, the book's extensive and pointed
promotion of murder, and Paladin's marketing strategy. Id.
134 See David Montgomery, Murder Manual Lawsuit Test First Amendment, WASH. POST.,
July 22, 1996, at 51. Montgomery explains that Paladin's attorneys assumed the worst set of
facts imaginable so that the other side could not argue the facts were in dispute that a jury
must decide. It was part of their strategy to kill the lawsuit before it reached the jury. If the
Judge did order a trial, Paladin's stipulations would be voided, since they were made only for
the purpose of a summary judgment motion, and the two sides would argue over the true
intent of Hit Man. Id. Paladin's stipulations were to avoid probing discovery motions and trial.
See David S. Savage, Did Hired Killer Go by the Book, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1997, at A17. Paladin's
attorneys agreed to accept the stipulations for the summary judgment motion in exchange for
a quick ruling on whether the first amendment barred liability. Id.
135 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 255.
136 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
137 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 842 (D. Md. 1996) (arguing that aider
and abettor tort liability has never been applied in such context).
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on theories of negligence, products liability, or attractive
nuisance.1 38 Furthermore, if a plaintiff's cause of action is brought
on the basis of aiding and abetting, the First Amendment will not
serve as a defense. 139 While, the theory of aiding and abetting has
generally not been applied in cases of media tort liability, Rice may
have paved the way for a proliferation of suits against the media
premised on this novel cause of action.140
Second, the circuit court in Rice seems to suggest that the
Brandenburg analysis is not applicable to cases involving the media if
political or social speech is not involved.1 41 The court stated in
conclusory terms that "one find[s] in Hit Man little if anything, even
remotely characterizable as the abstract criticism that Brandenburg
jealously protects."142 The circuit court, however, determined this
without analyzing the case under the elements of the Brandenburg
test, which has served as "the modem test for protection of speech
which has a 'tendency to lead to violence."1 43 Most courts address
the threshold issue of whether the speech is protected or not under
138 See Brill, supra note 4, at 986 (stating victims of media related harms have increasingly
relied on tort of negligence in seeking judicial remedy); see also Davidson, supra note 4, at 229
(reviewing doctrines of negligence, strict liability and incitement); Sims, supra note 5, at 272
(discussing various theories of tort liability).
139 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating under speech-
act doctrine, First Amendment poses no bar to theory of civil aiding and abetting); see, e.g.,
Model Penal Code section 223.4 (extortion or blackmail); Model Penal Code section 240.2
(threats and other improper influences in official and political matters); Model Penal Code
section 241 (perjury and various cognate crimes); Model Penal Code sections 5.02 and
2.06(3)(a)(i) (criminal solicitation); 18 U.S.C. section 871 (threatening life of President); Model
Penal Code section 5.03 (conspiracy); Model Penal Code section 250.4 (harassment); Model
Penal Code section 224.1 (forgery); Model Penal Code section 250.3 (false public alarms). See
generally Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (stating that "it rarely
has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends to speech or
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."); Nat'I
Org.for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646,656 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating fact that "aiding
and abetting of an illegal act may be carried out through speech is no bar to its illegality").
140 See Haag, supra note 4, at 1449 (recognizing that Rice may have created additional
cause of action for plaintiffs); Molnar, supra note 20, at 1333 (contending that Rice established
new class of unprotected speech in which liability attaches based upon tendency of words
used). See generally, Todd E. Simon, Libel As Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of
Care, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 449, 451 (1984) (discussing strict liability as applied to media
defendants); Wade, The Tort Liability of Investigative Reporters, 37 VAND. L. REv. 301, 303 (1984)
(discussing nature of liability in media related suits).
141 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (suggesting
Brandeniburg would apply in context of speech that is part and parcel of political or social
discourse); see also George Askelrud, Hit Man: The Fourth Circuit's Mistake in Rice, 19 LOY. L.A.
ENTr. L.J. 375, 395 (1999) (arguing that Brandenburg should have applied in Rice); Haag, supra
note 4, at 1450 (stating that Rice has raised serious questions as to whether Brandenburg applies
in cases involving media defendants); Molnar, supra note 20, at 1353 (noting that circuit court
felt that Brandenbnrg did not apply to Rice).
142 Rice, 128 F.3d at 262. (discussing Hitynan's instructions to murder).
143 See generally Crump, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing Brandenburg as defense).
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the First Amendment.144 If the speech does not fall outside of the
protection of the First Amendment, it is a well settled principle of
First Amendment jurisprudence, that one may not be subject to
criminal or civil liability.145 By abandoning this analysis, Rice has
potentially provided media defendants with less protection under
the First Amendment.
IV. THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISION IN RICE
A. The Theon of Aiding and Abetting In the Context of the Media
A major flaw in the circuit court's analysis in Rice was that the
court failed to analyze the facts of the case under the elements of a
cause of action in aiding and abetting.146 Although the court stated
that the First Amendment has generally posed no bar to an aiding
and abetting cause of action,147 the court failed to test the feasibility
of the theory as applied to the context of the case.148 While it may be
144 See Day, supra note 8, at 73 (noting that if speech does not fall into one of unprotected
categories, liability is barred); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern:
The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 47 (1990)
(discussing commercial advertising as speech excluded from full protection of First
Amendment); Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Consensus: The Verifiability of Allegedly
Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 43, 45 (1993) (discussing fact/opinion distinction
with respect to First Amendment); Quinlan, supra note 8, at 435 (1994) (recognizing that
speech not satisfying Brandenburg requirements should be accorded First Amendment
protection).
145 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (stating "[w]hat a State may
not constitutionally bring about by means of criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of
its civil law"); see also Day, supra note 12, at 74 (recognizing fundamental principle of First
Amendment that "state may not punish protected speech, directly or indirectly, whether by
criminal penalty or civil liability"); Hansen, supra note 145, at 53 (discussing crime of perjury
related to speech issue). See generally Askelrud, supra note 142, at 393, (noting that protected
speech may not be punished); Estlund, supra note 145, at 46 (providing that full First
Amendment protection is afforded ethical matters).
146 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 252 (4th Cir. 1997). The court stated that
a jury could find that Paladin assisted Perry in his commission of the murders since Perry
purchased Hit Man and because the method Perry used closely paralleled those contained in
the book. However, the court stated this without applying the fact to the elements of civil
aiding and abetting. Id.
147 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 243 (following speech-act doctrine, First Amendment poses not
bar to action based on theory of civil aiding and abetting); see also Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (stating that "[i]t rarely has been suggested that the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends to speech or writing used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute."); Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation
Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating fact that "aiding and abetting of an illegal act
may be carried out through speech is no bar to its illegality").
148 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 267. Without ever evaluating the case under the elements of aiding
and abetting, the court assumed that due to the "extraordinary comprehensiveness, detail and
clarity of Hit Man's instruction for criminal activity and murder in particular, the boldness of
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well settled that where speech is found to constitute aiding and
abetting, the First Amendment provides no defense;149 this Note
contends that Paladin's publication fails to satisfy the requisite
elements of this cause of action.
The landmark case for aiding and abetting is Halberstam v.
Welch.5O Halberstam articulated the elements necessary to establish a
cause of action in aiding and abetting: (1) the party whom the
defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury;
(2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an
overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the
assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially
assist the principal violation. 151 Liability for aiding and abetting
often turns on how much encouragement or substantial assistance
its palpable exhortation to murder, the alarming power and effectiveness of its peculiar form
of instruction, the notable absence from its text of the kinds of ideas for the protection of
which the First Amendment exists, and the books evident lack of any even arguable legitimate
purpose beyond the promotion and teaching or murder.. .we are confident that the First
Amendment does not erect an absolute bar to the imposition of civil liability." Id.
149 See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (noting well established line of
decisions hold that generally applicable laws do not offend First Amendment); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1949) (stating First Amendment is no defense
where speech or writing used is integral part of conduct in violation of criminal statute); Nat'l
Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646,656 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating fact that aiding
and abetting of an illegal act may be carried out through speech is no bar to its illegality).
150 See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Halberstan, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held the live in companion of a burglar civilly
liable for a murder that occurred during the course of a burglary, on theories of aiding and
abetting as well as conspiracy. Id at 474. The facts in Halberstam demonstrated that Bernard
Welch, who had committed numerous burglaries in the Washington area, killed Michael
Halberstram, while in the process of burglarizing Haberstams' home. Id at 472. Halberstams'
estate brought a wrongful death and survival action against Bernard Welch and Linda
Hamilton, his live in companion, alleging that the two engaged in a joint criminal venture and
conspiracy. Id at 474. Welch had no outside employment, yet the couple rose from "rags to
riches" in a short period of time as a result of Welch's innumerable burglaries. Id. In the words
of the district court "[s]he closed neither her eyes nor her pocketbook to the reality of the life
she and Welch were living. She was compliant, but neither dumb nor duped, so long as her
personal comfort and fortune were assured". Id. Hamilton was well aware of the means by
which Welch acquired their wealth. Id. at 475-76. Additionally, Hamilton typed transmittal
letters for the sales of the stolen goods, she did inventory of the goods sold, and did general
secretarial work and bookkeeping for Welch's "business". Id. at 475. Buyers of the goods made
check payable to Hamilton, which she deposited into her own personal bank account. Id. This
evidence clearly supported a finding that Hamilton was liable for aiding and abetting Welch
in his killing of Halberstam. Id at 487. The first of the three elements is fulfilled as Welch killed
Halberstam during the course of a burglary. Id. Hamilton was well aware of her role in
Welch's continuing criminal enterprise during the time that she provided assistance, thereby,
satisfying the second element. Id. Finally, with regard to the third element, the court applied
the five Restatement factors, and concluded that Hamilton assisted Welch with the knowledge
that he had engaged in illegal acquisition of goods. Id. For a general discussion of the history
of Halberstamn v. Welch and the impact it has had on accomplice liability see Haag, supra note 4,
at 1452.
151 See Halberstamn, 705 F.2d at 477 (discussing elements of aiding and abetting).
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the defendant provided.152 The Restatement of Torts suggests five
factors in making this determination: (1) the nature of the act
encouraged; (2) the amount of assistance given by the defendant; (3)
the defendant's presence or absence at the time of the tort; (4) the
defendant's relation to the other tortfeasor; and (5) the defendant's
state of mind.153
Rather than closely analyzing the feasibility of the theory as
applied to the facts of the case, the Circuit Court in Rice erroneously
concluded that Paladin Enterprises may be civilly liable in tort on
the basis of Hit Man's tendency to lead to violence and unlawful
activity.' 54 The court impermissibly focused on the explicit nature of
the instructions contained in Hit Man, its lack of legitimate purpose
or redeeming social value, and Hit Man's tendencies to cause
harm.155 The court concluded that from this, a jury could reasonably
infer that Paladin possessed the requisite intent to be subject to
liability for aiding and abetting.' 56 Allowing liability based on
inferences that may be drawn from the negative tendencies of a
work alone is in clear contravention of the core value of the First
Amendment.157
The Supreme Court made clear in Hess that "speech does not lose
its First Amendment protection merely because it has a 'tendency to
152 See Halberstain, 705 F.2d at 477; see e.g., Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168,
178 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (employing similar test in context of securities fraud); Woodward v. Metro
Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1975) (modifying test to require awareness of role in
improper activity); Landy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3rd Cir. 1973)
(focusing analysis of third party liability on elements of Restatement section 876). But cf, 18
U.S.C.A. §2 (1999) (establishing different elements required for proof of criminal aiding and
abetting).
153 See Halberstain, 705 F.2d at 477; see e.g., Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822, 822-23 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that defendant who verbally encouraged assailant is jointly and severally
liable for battery); Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 383, 388 (Ark. 1975) (imposing joint
liability upon defendant who uttered suggestive words to perpetrator who subsequently
caused injury to bystander with automobile).
154 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1073) (noting that speech does not lose its First
Amendment protection merely because it is found to have bad tendency); see also Askelrud,
supra note 142, at 381 (recognizing that speech may not be punished merely because of its bad
tendency); Brill, supra note 4, at 992 (arguing approach used by circuit court can be likened to
"bad tendency" test articulated in Debs v. S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919), which is no longer used as
it is impermissible to suppress speech on basis of its tendency); Molnar, supra note 17, at 1334
(arguing that decision in Rice has created new class of unprotected speech, where liability
attaches based upon tendency of words used).
155 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 252-55 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
because of Hit Mani's tendencies, Paladin may be civilly liable for aiding and abetting).
156 See id. at 255.
157 See Hess, 414 U.S. at 109 (holding that speech which has tendency to lead to violence is
insufficient to deem such speech unprotected under first amendment).
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lead to violence."1 58 The "bad tendency" test would permit a jury to
infer intent, or to suppress speech, based on the mere tendency of the
speaker's words, especially where a jury finds such words to be
morally reprehensible or lacking in redeeming social value.159 In
addition, many works are capable of being put to a bad use, and
thus, may arguably have a tendency to do harm.160 Information
obtained from true crime novels and factual news accounts may be
used to achieve an unlawful purpose, just as the information
contained in Hit Man was used.161 Conceivably, if Rice is broadly
interpreted by future courts, it could potentially be expanded to
reach many kinds of otherwise protected speech.162
The circuit court in Rice relied on various cases involving aiding
158 Hess, 414 U.S. at 109; see also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th
Cir. 1987) (citing Hess); Quinlan and Persels, supra note 8, at 430 n.87 (citing Hess).
159 See Molnar, supra note 20, at 1370 (discussing implications of "bad tendency" test); see
also Brill, supra note 4, at 992 (recognizing that showing that speech has bad tendency is
insufficient to warrant suppression of that speech).
160 See Davidson, supra note 4, at 291-92. Davidson discusses The Turner Diaries, a fictional
novel written by William Pierce. Id. The Turner Diaries was used by Timothy McVeigh in
executing the Oklahoma City bombing. However, Davidson raises the question, "should one
jump from the conclusion that a book such as the Turner Diaries may prove a blueprint for
mayhem to the conclusion that the book should be banned?' Id. Davidson recognizes that
suppressing this kind of speech may not be the answer to the problem. Id. at 293. She notes
that even if The Turner Diaries was banned, there would be alternative sources to obtain
similar information, especially with the increasing use of the Internet. The Internet contains
information such as bomb recipes and other potentially dangerous information, however,
tr ing to restrict such information would prove to be a monumental, if not impossible, task.
161 See Crump, supra note 16, at 27-29 (recognizing that movies, truthful newspaper
accounts and even cartoons have capability of leading to violence, yet this alone does not
justify their suppression); see also Davidson, supra note 4, at 240 (asserting "not only fictional
works, but even news stories or historical accounts could inspire some persons to murder");
Dilworth, supra note 20, at 573 (stating "at the heart of legal debate is the difficulty many
scholars have in distinguishing between the book Hitinan and certain movies, fictional
literature, and music containing some of the same kinds of information, which, when it falls
into the wrong hands, becomes a danger to innocent individuals"); Vansen, supra note 7, at
629-630 (noting that fictional treatment of crime and even media reports of actual crimes can
promote violence); Symposium, Massaging the Medium: Analyzing and Responding to Media
Violence Without Hanning the First Amendment, 4 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 17, 17 (1995) (noting
"(tiwo surveys of young American male violent felons found that 22-34% had imitated crime
techniques they watched on television programs").
162 See Davidson, supra note 4, at 302. For instance, Davidson considers these incidents:
When Mark David Chapman murdered John Lennon, he clutched a copy of Catcher In the Rye,
by J.D. Salinger. Martin Scorcese's film Taxi Driver inspired John Hinkley, who shot President
Reagan in an attempt to impress actress Jodie Foster. Barry Loukaitis murdered his algebra
teacher and two male students, reportedly inspired by Stephen King's book Rage. Id. A 14-year
old Texas boy decapitated and killed a 13-year old girl, and a young Oklahoma couple shot
and paralyzed a 37-year old convenience store clerk; both acts allegedly as a result of Oliver
Stone's movie Natural Boni Killers. Id. at 239. This raises the question, should Salinger,
Scorcese, King and Stone be held accountable for these occurrences. Id. at 302. For a broader
discussion of the potential for the Rice decision to suppress formerly protected speech see
Molnar, snpra note 20, at 1364.
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and abetting,163 including U.S. v. Barnett164 and U.S. v. Kelley.165
While the court analogized Rice with the facts of these cases, the
amount of awareness and assistance given in these cases was much
more than that which existed in Rice.166 In addition, the district court
noted that the "plaintiffs provided no authority that would allow
the court to apply the holdings in these criminal cases to the facts of
the instant case" which was a civil suit.167 These cases further help
to illustrate that the cause of action of aiding and abetting is not
appropriate in the context of the media.168
This Note contends that it is not feasible for Rice, or any other
163 See United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
Brandenburg inapplicable to conviction for conspiring to transport and aiding and abetting
interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia, where defendants disseminated
computer program that assisted others to record and analyze bets on sporting events); see also
United States v. Fleschner, 98 F.3d 155, 158-59 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendants who
instructed and advised meeting attendees to file unlawful tax returns were not entitled to First
Amendment jury instruction on charge of conspiracy to defraud United States of income tax
revenue because "the defendants' words and acts were not remote from the commission of the
criminal acts"); United States v. Burtorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that tax
evasion speeches were not subject to Brandenburg because they go beyond mere advocacy of
tax reform).
164 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982). In Barnett, the defendant published informational manuals
which provided detailed information for the production of various illegal drugs. Id. at 837.
The defendant published an advertisement for the sale of such instructional manuals in High
Ties Magazine. Id. at 838. Not only did the instructions explain how to manufacture the drug
PCP, it also instructed the reader of a reliable supply house where the necessary chemicals
may be purchased, and in addition, provided the reader with the precise address of this
supply house. Id. 838-39.
165 769 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985). In Kelly, the defendant was the organizer and leader of a
group that embraced the notion that federal income tax is unconstitutional as applied to
wages. The defendant was convicted of conspiring to defraud the federal government and of
aiding and abetting in the preparation of false W-4 forms. Id. Kelly not only provided the
members with detailed instructions on how to prepare their income tax forms, but in return
for the dues paid by the members, he provided members with W4 forms for the claiming of
exemptions from withholding, and blank copies of refund claim forms. Kelly also informed
the members that he held himself in readiness to talk to any employer that declined to honor
the claimed withholding exemption form or who threatened to call the claimed exemption to
the attention of the Internal Revenue Service. The defendant also promised the group
members that if they followed his advice "he would keep them out of trouble." Id. The court
found that Kelly was aware of his role as part of the criminal operation, and he knowingly
provided substantial assistance to identifiable individuals. Id.
166 See Haag, supra note 4, at 1457 (arguing that aiding and abetting is not applicable in
context of media); see also Molnar, supra note 20, at 1352 (criticizing circuit court's speech-act
doctrine analysis).
167 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 842-43 (D. Md. 1996) (distinguishing
Barnett and Burtoff from facts of Rice); see also Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 308 A.2d 649, 656
(N.J. 1973) (stating "to borrow...from definitions of aiding and abetting in the criminal
field... is entirely inappropriate").
168 See Haag, supra note 4, at 1457 (arguing that Texas should not recognize aiding and
abetting in context of media works); see also Molnar, supra note 20, at 1352-53 (stating
"although the court does consider Hit Man a speech-act in the form of aiding and abetting,
this conclusion is based on a tenuous application of the facts to a questionable interpretation
of the law, and may not even be supported by a case upon which the court relies.").
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plaintiff seeking to hold a media defendant liable for injuries
allegedly resulting from the defendant's speech, to establish that the
media defendant was aware of their role as part of the illegal or
tortious activity, or that the media defendant knowingly and
substantially assisted the plaintiff in this activity.169 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that to establish aiding and abetting, it
must be shown that the defendant "in some sort associate himself
with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he
wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it
succeed."170 This has been interpreted to mean that there must exist
169 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241 n.2 (4 Cir. 1997). The court stated that
at all relevant times, defendants had no specific knowledge (1) that either Perry or Horn
planned to commit a crime; (2) that Perry and Horn had entered into a conspiracy for the
purpose of committing a crime; and (3) that Perry had been retained by Horn to murder
Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn, or Janice Saunders. Id. Analyzing the facts of Rice, under a
Halberstain analysis, as mentioned above, Paladin Enterprises was generally not aware of their
role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that the book was written and
published. [d. Each of the books was published in 1982, however, Perry and Horn did not
begin plotting the murders until February of 1992, ten years later. Id. at 239. With regard to the
third element, Paladin Enterprises did not knowingly and substantially assist Perry in his
murder of the three decedents. Id. Considering the Restatement factors, the second factor is
not likely to be satisfied, as the amount of assistance given by Paladin is arguably not
substantial. While the book provides the reader with instruction for the commission of
murder, nothing in the book says "go out and commit murder now." Instead, the book seems
to say, "if you want to be a hit man, this is what you need to do." See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
Moreover, nothing in Hit Man can be characterized as a command to murder the three
particular victims in Rice. Id. With respect to the third factor, Paladin was dearly not present
at the time the murders were committed. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241 n.2. Turning to the fourth
factor, Paladin's relationship with Perry was nothing more than an arm's length transaction.
Id. Perry merely purchased the book from Paladin through a mail order catalogue; the
relationship between the parties went no further. Id. Lastly, the fifth factor arguably weighs in
favor of Paladin. Paladin stipulated that it intended the manual to be used by would-be
criminals, but the circuit court believed that even without such stipulations, the requisite
intent could be inferred from the fact that the murders committed by Perry closely paralleled
the instructions contained in Hit Man. Id. at 251.
Not only are such inferences inadequate to establish liability, it is arguable that Paladin
did not desire the outcome in Rice to be the result of its publication. See Radwan, supra note 28,
at 69. "Paladin probably only intended to do what most businesses do: make a profit." Id. In
addition, Paladin stipulated that its marketing strategy was intended to attract criminals and
would-be criminals in order to maximize sales of its publications to the public, including
authors who desire information for the purpose of writing books about crime and criminals,
law enforcement officers and agencies who desire information concerning the means and
methods of committing crimes, persons who enjoy reading accounts of crimes and the means
of committing them, and criminologists and others who study criminal methods and
mentality. See Rice 128 F.3d at 241 n.2. Additionally, the advertisement in Paladin's mail order
catalogue contains the disclaimer "for academic study only." See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848. The
book itself also contains the disclaimer "for information purposes only." Id. The district court
noted that this does not indicate a tendency to incite violence. Id.
170 See United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v.
Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)); see also Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613,
619 (1949) (stating same where defendants perpetrated fraud against United States
government); United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2nd Cir. 1938) (stating same where
defendant supplied counterfeit currency to perpetrator with knowledge it would enter stream
of commerce).
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some affirmative participation by the defendant.171 Absent the
requisite affirmative and active involvement, Paladin's publication
cannot be deemed to constitute aiding and abetting.172 These
requirements were not satisfied in Rice, and they would presumably
not be present in any other case involving the media.
D. Courts Should Adhere to a Brandenburg Analysis
It has been argued the Rice decision has suggested that
Brandenburg is limited to cases involving political or social speech,
and would therefore, not apply to media works that allegedly incite
illegal or dangerous activity.173 Several commentators have argued
that the Brandenburg test presents an exceedingly difficult standard
to meet.174 These critics have argued that courts should relax the
Brandenburg standard, and apply a balancing approach to these
cases. 175 This Note contends that courts should adhere to a bright
171 See Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 623 (recognizing that aider must encourage perpetrator
through some affirmative action); see, e.g., United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932, 933-34 (8th
Cir. 1974) (stating same where defendant supplied perpetrator with drugs); United States v.
Thomas, 469 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1972) (stating same where defendants were present during
armed robbery).
172 See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 842 (noting absence of any reported decision suggesting that
Maryland extend tort of aiding and abetting to circumstances of this case); see also Haag, supra
note 4, at 1460-61 (arguing that media defendant will almost never provide "substantial
assistance" necessary to impose liability under theory of aiding and abetting); Molnar, supra
note 20, at 1352 (stating circuit court's determination that Paladin's actions constituted aiding
and abetting was based on tenuous application of facts to questionable interpretation of law).
173 See Coursey, supra note 20, at 898 (analyzing decision of circuit court), see also Haag,
supra note 4, at 1449 (addressing impact of decision in Rice); Molnar, supra note 20, at 1353
(addressing non-application of Brandenburg).
174 See Vansen, supra note 7, at 610 (proposing reworking of Brandenburg standard); see
also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., concurring and
dissenting) (discussing inadequacy of Brandenburg test); Crump, supra note 16, at 54
(suggesting case-by-case analysis); Sims, supra note 5, at 282-92 (explaining two-tiered
balancing test); Smith, supra note 7, at 1195 (arguing for application of traditional negligence
theory).
175 See, e.g. Sims, supra note 5, at 282-92. Professor Sims proposes a two-tiered balancing
test involving a preliminary inquiry as to whether the speech is categorically unprotected. See
id. at 282. If the speech falls into one of the unprotected categories, it will not be afforded First
Amendment protection. Id. After this preliminary inquiry, the court will address the first tier
of the balancing test to determine whether the subject speech will retain its presumption of
First Amendment protection. Id. This next step involves an assessment of several different
factors. Id. The first factor is whether a specific potential plaintiff was identifiable in advance
of the speech. See id. at 283. The second asks if the defendant knew of, or should have foreseen
the danger. See id. at 284. The third examines the gravity of the danger involved. See id. The
fourth factor evaluates how the speech recipient was led to engage in the activity dangerous
to himself or to others. See id. at 285. The fifth factor asks if the danger was obvious to the
speech recipient. See id. at 286. An additional consideration is whether the media defendant
participated in the origination of the speech in question, or if it was only a "neutral
disseminator of the speech" of others. See id. If the speech has survived the first level of
inquiry, the court then addresses the second tier. See id. at 288. At this level, the court weighs
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line Brandenburg analysis. That is, in cases involving physical
injuries that allegedly arise from media works, if the speech in
question does not meet the Brandenburg test, the speech must be
deemed protected and liability shall not be imposed.176
While the circuit court in Rice seems to suggest that Brandenburg is
only applicable to speech "part and parcel of political or social
discourse", this Note asserts that this proposition contravenes the
interests protected by the First Amendment. Political speech may
arguably be at "the core of the First Amendment."177 However, the
Supreme Court, generally, has not differentiated between categories
of protected speech to determine levels or degrees of constitutional
protection.178 "Such an endeavor would not only be hopelessly
complicated but would raise substantial concern that the worthiness
of speech might be judged by majoritarian notions of political and
social propriety and morality."179 First, adherence to a strict
Brandenburg approach would be most consistent with public policy
considerations which dictate that one should be held personally
two considerations. See id. at 288-92. The first consideration is whether the speech categorized
according to its content, has generally been regarded as protectable speech. See id. at 288. The
second consideration evaluates how invasive or chilling the imposition of liability would be to
the functional role of the media in the future. See id. at 291. See also Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting). In her
concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Jones suggested that a balancing approach, rather
than the Brandenburg test, should be used in cases involving media liability. See id. at 1029. Her
analysis begins with an examination of the publication, where the court would determine
where the speech lies in the hierarchy of First Amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 1026. This
involves an assessment of whether the speech in question is a bona fide competitor in the
"marketplace of ideas." See id. Judge Jones contends that the First Amendment analysis is an
exercise in line drawing between the legitimate interest of society to regulate itself and the
paramount necessity of robust uninhibited debate. See id. at 1027. She suggests the balancing
approach used in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Judge
Jones applied this analysis in Herceg, arguing that Hustler deserved limited protection because
it is an obscene and commercial publication, which did not require special protection to
ensure robust debate of public issues. See id. at 1029. She concluded that a state regulation
would be appropriate if the means were narrowly tailored to prevent a specific harm and
were not broader than necessary to accomplish the purpose. See id.
176 See Day, supra note 8, at 73 (noting that if speech does not fall into one of unprotected
categories, liability is barred); see also Askelrud, supra note 142, at 393 (noting that speech not
constituting incitement is protected); Prettyman and Hook, supra note 5, at 372 (stating if
programming doesn't rise to level of incitement, such speech is fully protected and may not be
abridged by tort liability); Quinlan and Persels, supra note 8, 435 (recognizing that speech not
satisfying Brandenburg requirements should be afforded First Amendment protection).
177 N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886,926-27 (1982).
178 See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024 (1987) (arguing that
Brandenburg is notlimited to political speech).
179 Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024. The court went on to state that "if the shield of the First
Amendment can be eliminated by proving after publication that an article discussing a
dangerous idea negligently helped bring about a real injury simply because the idea can be
identified as 'bad,' all free speech becomes threatened." Id.
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accountable for their reprehensible and illegal conduct.180 The
murders committed by James Perry were of his own volition, and
may, perhaps, have been committed with or without the
information contained in Paladin's Hit Man.1 81 Furthermore, courts
should not impose liability on the media merely because their works
are capable of being put to an illegal purpose.182 Nor should the
media bear the burden of paying for the irrational acts of
criminals.183
180 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (stating "[o]ur whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving the government power to control men's minds");
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring) (stating
"those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men
free to develop their faculties"); see also Brill, supra note 4, at 1024 (recognizing that "speaker
liability for imitative harms undermines notions of free will and individual autonomy which
are central to both First Amendment jurisprudence and criminal law"); Don Scheid,
Constructing a Theonj of Punishment, Desert and the Distribution of Punishments, 10 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 441, 471 (discussing "responsibility of the individual"). See generally Askelrud, supra
note 142, at 378 (noting "libertarian theorists view people as independent and rational
decision makers with the right to control their own thoughts and beliefs without government
interference").
181 See Dilworth, supra note 20, at 591 (recognizing argument that Hit Man was not cause
of murders and did not incite Perry because persons like Perry are predisposed to commit
such crimes); see also Davidson, supra note 4, at 291-92, 292 n.361 (noting that there are many
books capable of being put to same purpose as Hit Man. including The Anarchists Cookbook,
Death by Deception: Advanced Inprovised Booby Traps, Disnptive Terrorism, and The Turner
Diaries).
182 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 4, at 291-92. Davidson discusses The Turner Diaries, a
fictional novel written by William Pierce. The Turner Diaries was used by Timothy McVeigh in
executing the Oklahoma City bombing. However, Davidson raises the question, "should one
jump from the conclusion that a book such as Tze Turnter Diaries may prove a blueprint for
mayhem to the conclusion that the book should be banned?". Id. Davidson recognizes that
suppressing this kind of speech may not be the answer to the problem. Id. at 293. She notes
that even if The Turner Diaries was banned, there are alternative sources to obtain similar
information, especially with the increasing use of the Internet. Id. The Internet contains
information such as bomb recipes and other potentially dangerous information, however,
trying to restrict such information would prove to be a monumental, if not impossible, task.
Id. The "average person including judge and juror undoubtedly recognizes that an
enlightened society must accept certain risks that result from innovative, challenging
programming". See Prettyman & Hook, supra note 5, at 380. Prettyman and Hook assert that
judges and juries are reluctant to find liability or award damages when someone imitates
violent scenarios. Id.
183 See McCollum v. CBS, 202 Cal. App. 3d. 989, 1006 (1988) (stating "it is simply not
acceptable to a free and democratic society to impose a duty upon performing artists to limit
and restrict their creativity in order to avoid the dissemination of ideas in artistic speech
which may adversely affect emotionally troubled individuals.. .[s]uch a burden would
quickly have the effect of reducing and limiting artistic expression to only the broadest
standard of taste and acceptance and the lowest level of offense"); see also Watters v. TSR, 904
F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that "defendant cannot be faulted...for putting its game
on the market without attempting to ascertain the mental condition of each and every
prospective player. The only way of ensuring that the game could never reach a 'mentally
fragile' individual would be to refrain from selling it at all"); Yakubowicz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (quoting McCollum); Davidson, supra note
4, at 303-04 (discussing problem of holding artists liable for what "nut" does in reaction to
artist's work); Prettyman & Hook, supra note 5, at 380 (stating that "the result of imposing
upon television and movie producers the duty of avoiding any scene that could possibly
[Vol. 15:187
TORT LIABILITY OF THE MEDIA
Application of a balancing approach to cases involving free
speech, as suggested by some commentators, would severely impair
the First Amendment rights of the media. 8 4 An ad hoc approach
would leave a defendant's First Amendment rights subject to the
whim of a judge or jury.185 Such an approach would give courts an
excessive degree of discretion to censor works they may simply
deem offensive or socially abhorrent.186 This is exemplified in the
circuit court's decision in Rice, where the court placed an
unwarranted amount of weight on Hit Man's alleged lack of
redeeming social value and supposed "bad tendency" to do
harm.187 "The Fourth Circuit's decision, is unfortunately, the first
step backwards to a time when speech was permissible only if the
majority permitted it."188 The First Amendment does not allow
courts to adjudicate according to personal belief or opinion, nor
does it permit the court to suppress speech merely because it is
regarded by the court to be vile or repugnant.189 "'If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation,' it is that the
government may not 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."1 90 Brandenburg
trigger violent reaction in few individuals would be a timidity and blandness in programming
that few are prepared to accept").
184 See Quinlan and Persels, supra note 8, at 436 (discussing need for application of
Brandenburg); see also Brill, supra note 4, at 1025 (arguing in support of Brandenburg standard in
imitative cases); Molnar, supra note 20, at 1368-69 (discussing disadvantages of balancing
approach); Sims, supra note 5, at 274 (recognizing problem of negligence tort actions against
media due to potential for unlimited class of plaintiffs and potential for unlimited liability).
185 See Quinlan and Persels, supra note 8, at 436 (arguing that allowing judges and juries
to decide whether media defendants may be held liable in damages would result in de facto
censorship); see also Brill, supra note 4, at 1015 (discussing ad hoc analysis). See generally Smith,
snpra note 7, at 1201 (discussing case-by-case approach).
186 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (discussing principle that there
is no such thing as false idea); see also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of
N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959) (arguing that First Amendment does not only protect
conventional ideas of majoritarian morality); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017,
1019 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating "the benefits gained from the free and open exchange of ideas
outweighs the costs endured by receiving harmful or reproachable thoughts").
187 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (noting that speech may be suppressed on
basis of "bad tendency"); see also Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024 (citing Hess); Brill, supra note 4, at 992
(recognizing that showing speech has "bad tendency" is insufficient to warrant suppression of
that speech); Molnar, supra note 20, at 1370 (discussing implications of "bad tendency" test);
Quinlan and Persels, supra note 8, at 430 n.87 (citing Hess).
188 Molnar, supra note 20, at 1370.
189 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (stating "however pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of
other ideas"); see also Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1020 (citing Gertz); Brill, supra note 4, at 1026 (noting
that there is no such thing as false idea).
190 Brill, supra note 4, at 1027 (quoting West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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would provide a framework which would guard against such
unbridled discretion.191
Second, the Brandenburg test would best preserve the values
represented by the First Amendment.192 The ability to predict when
speech may be subject to liability is critical to the media's interest in
free speech.193 Furthermore, it is a cornerstone of the First
Amendment, that the state may not impose liability where speech is
deemed to be protected.194 "The ability to predict when speech will
be subject to liability is crucial to the maintenance of free speech."'195
A less restrictive test than Brandenburg would lead to self censorship
and have inevitable chilling effects on media speech.196
CONCLUSION
The freedom of speech is one of our most sacred liberties. Justice
191 See Crump, supra note 16, at 46 (noting that case-by-case analysis leaves judges
without clear guidelines); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (holding that
proper guidance of government personnel who enforce law is more significant concern raised
by vague standards); Brill, supra note 4, at 1025 (arguing in support of Brandenburg standard in
imitative cases); see also Molnar, supra note 20, at 1368-69 (discussing disadvantages of
balancing approach); Quinlan and Persels, supra note 8, at 436 (discussing need for application
of Brandenburg); Sims, supra note 5, at 274 (recognizing problem of negligence tort actions
against media due to potential for unlimited class of plaintiffs and potential for unlimited
liability).
192 See Haag, supra note 4, at 1470 (discussing sacred rights protected by First
Amendment); see also Brill, supra note 4, at 989 (arguing that courts should not relax
Brandenburg standard); Quinlan & Persels, supra note 8, at 435 (arguing that courts should
adhere to bright line First Amendment defense). But see Frederick Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf and
the First Aendmnent, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 163-67 (1990) (criticizing strict application of
Brandenburg test).
193 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 658 (1981) (stating if
governmental regulation impinges upon basic First Amendment rights, burden is on
government to show absence of less intrusive alternatives); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 379 (1968) (noting that any incidental regulation of speech must be no greater than
necessary to further government interest); Brill, supra note 4, at 1016 (stating that without
predictability, there may be chilling effects on speech); Smith, supra note 7, at 1228-29 (noting
that lack of guidance would have chilling effect on media speech).
194 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (stating "[w]hat a state may
not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of
its civil law"); see also Day, supra note 8, at 74 (recognizing that it is bedrock principle of First
Amendment that state may not punish protected speech, directly or indirectly, whether by
criminal penalty or civil liability); Smith, supra note 7, at 1201-02 (noting that if speech is
found to be unprotected, state may regulate it through either criminal or civil penalties).
195 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 780 n.5 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing unpredictable nature of "public concern" test); see also
Brill, supra note 4, at 1039.
196 See Gannett Vo. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 n.25 (1979) (noting that avoiding
prior restraint is "chief purpose" of First Amendment); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
462 (1907) (stating main purpose of First Amendment is to prevent prior restraints); Smith,
supra note 7, at 1201-02 (stating that vague or overbroad regulations violate Constitution
through their chilling effect).
TORT LIABILIY OF THE MEDIA
Marshall once said "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a state has no business telling [one].. .what books [they]
may read or what films [they] may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control [people's] minds."197 The First Amendment protects speech
that evokes anger, hatred and disgust. It has protected speech as
repulsive as the burning of the American flag.' 98 Many of the cases
discussed in this Note are tragic and inevitably appeal to our
emotions. Intuitively there is a desire to place blame and punish
speech which appears to be the cause of harm, especially where
such speech is characterized as being vile or repugnant. However,
upon closer analysis, such punishment in most cases is contrary to
the well settled values of First Amendment jurisprudence. The
benefits that flow from the free and open exchange of ideas far
outweigh the damage caused by disseminating harmful or
reproachable thoughts.199 The mere fact that certain speech has a
potential to cause harm is simply not sufficient to suppress such
speech. To be guided by such a principle would have far reaching
consequences that the First Amendment simply does not permit.
Courts addressing cases like those discussed here must bear in mind
that the purpose of this freedom is not to protect the speech we
welcome, but rather to protect the speech we choose to hate.
Justine Wellstood
197 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
198 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402 (1989) (holding defendant's conviction for
burning of American flag inconsistent with First Amendment).
199 See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987).
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